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We highlight how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be strategically used against 
the negative perception from earnings management (EM). Using international data, we 
analyse the effect of CSR and EM on the cost of capital and corporate reputation. Results 
confirm that CSR strategy is positively valued by investors and other stakeholders. Contrary 
to EM, CSR has a positive effect on corporate reputation and lowers the cost of capital. In 
addition, we also find that the favorable effect of CSR on cost of capital is consistently more 
intense in firms that show signs of EM indicating that the market does not identify when CSR 
practices are used as a strategy to mask EM. We also demonstrate how institutional factors 
influence the above relationship.  
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The emphasis on accounting discipline has increased sharply over the past decade and 
it forms the basis of good corporate governance. Corporate behavior is scrutinized more 
intensively by all stakeholders including the regulators and the financial press. In our paper, 
we focus on Earnings Management (EM) practices and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). According to Zahra et al. (2005), the consequences of these discretionary practices 
affect investors, employees, customers and the local communities, which is eventually 
reflected in corporate reputation and, hence, the market value.  Improvements in Earnings 
Quality lower information asymmetry and affect the cost of capital (Francis et al., 2005, 
2008a; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Blanco et al., 2009). Furthermore, accounting practices 
could affect the value of companies, their stakeholder relationships, reputation and corporate 
image (Fombrun et al., 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006).  
On the other hand, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is playing an increasingly 
important part in the overall corporate strategy. But the reasons for companies to engage in 
these activities are still unclear and some articles point out that it decreases shareholders’ 
equity (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Others argue that CSR is a crucial strategic element 
for success in product market competition and it increases sales revenue, improves the 
company’s reputation (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001) and reduces the market’s perception of 
its business risk leading to a lower cost of capital.   
These benefits have led to a dramatic growth of CSR practices in the industry, but the 
suspicion of ‘green washing’ rather than a whole hearted commitment to social and 
environmental causes persists. Milne (2013) points out that in spite of a substantial increase 
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in claims of sustainable practices by corporations and the communication of the rationale in 
the past two decades, there has been no real increase in organisational transparency and 
accountability regarding their impact on the society and the environment. Banerjee (2007) 
provides a critical perspective by explaining that sustainable practices and CSR is narrowly 
defined in the financial press and in academic discourses, and the ideology is being used to 
legitimise the power of large corporations at a cost to societal interests. Delmas et al (2013) 
point out that most of CSR ratings are developed by small and private organizations with 
limited transparency about the evaluation process. Furthermore, managers can use CSR 
practices as a means of self-promotion and personal benefits rather than a discretionary 
activity that promote sustainable growth going beyond their or the company’s own welfare 
(Handelman and Arnold, 1999; Banerjee, 2007). Prior et al. (2008) and Gargouri et al. 
(2010), show that managers in companies that indulge in EM are more likely to carry out 
these discretionary practices, possibly in order to help them secure their jobs and increase 
compensation. We contribute to this literature by analysing the combined effect of EM and 
CSR to address whether CSR can be used to mask the effect of aggressive accounting 
practices on cost of capital and corporate reputation.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a large sample of listed companies from 26 
countries and covers the period from 2006-2010. The econometric models take account of the 
level of investor protection and country specific attitudes towards CSR to control for the 
institutional differences across our sample. EM practices are proxied by discretionary 
accruals, specifically by the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), which is the most 
commonly applied method in the literature. The proxy for CSR is compiled using global data 
on environment, human rights, stakeholder relations and board composition of companies 
provided by Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS). We measure the implied cost of 
capital using the price-earnings ratio divided by the short-term earnings growth rate. This 
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widely used Price/Earnings to growth ratio (the PEG ratio) was proposed by Easton (2004) 
and we follow the method in El Ghoul (2011), Botosan and Plumlee (2005), and Blanco et al. 
(2009) to construct this variable. Finally, we use the Fortune Index to measure Corporate 
Reputation. Following the method used by Fombrun and Shanley (1990) and Melo and 
Garrido-Morgado (2012), we create a dummy variable to identify a firm as one of the world’s 
most admired companies based on the top 50 surveys and industry rankings for each year 
during the sample period.  
We use the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator on the panel data to analyze the effect on cost of capital and use Logit models for 
Corporate Reputation. We show that EM practices leads to higher costs of capital and lower 
reputation. Based on the extant literature we argue that this result is driven by the perceived 
uncertainty resulting in a discounting of the value of the information reported by the company 
engaging in EM practices. On the contrary, a lower rate of return is demanded by investors 
whose money is in companies promoting CSR practices, and more importantly the effect is 
significantly more favorable for firms engaging in EM. We also document that a company’s 
chances of being listed among the world’s most admired companies increase when they 
display positive CSR strategies. Unlike previous literature in this field, these results clearly 
highlight that CSR activities can be used to mask EM practices. This interpretation is 
supported by the theoretical arguments that point out that sustainability reporting by 
companies and the CSR scores, widely used by investors and stakeholders are difficult to 
decipher and companies might benefi from this information asymmetry and use these 
communications to clear their image while having little or no real commitment to sustainable 
practices. Our analyses also show that the firms engaging in EM can avoid being punished 
through higher risk premium by engaging in CSR activities, particularly in countries with 
higher investor protection.  To check for institutional difference in the pattern of the 
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relationships, we divide the sample into civil law and common law countries. The shielding 
effect of CSR works well in civil law country, but markets in common law countries seem to 
penalize EM irrespective of CSR credentials.  
In the next section, we discuss the related literature and establish a set of testable 
hypotheses. In section 3, we describe the sample, variables and empirical methodology used 
to test the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis and discusses 
them. The concluding section summarises the main findings, point out the limitations of this 
study and suggest lines for possible future research. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Earnings Management, Cost of Capital and Corporate Reputation 
Accounting numbers should aim to portray a realistic picture of the financial flow and 
stock in the current year and smooth out transitory components to make the statements more 
representative. But the managers’ might intentionally manage accounting results for short-
term personal benefits rather than for the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders 
who would usually have a longer horizon (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). EM1 may be purely a 
financial recording decision in which the adjustments are done in the way facts are accounted 
for, usually by means of provisions, accruals adjustments or changes in criteria and 
repayment systems. Managers usually prefer this route: they are less visible and less costly, 
unlike ‘real’ EM decisions which affect the company’s performance and operations, such as 
the optimal moment for selling or the selection of R&D projects. As noted by Gargouri et al. 
1 The basis of EM practices has been established by the Agency and the Positive Accounting theories. The 
conflict of interest arising from the separation between ownership and control (which is the basis of the Agency 
Theory) and information asymmetry between the two parties create a vacuum where managers behave 
discretionarily, do not take into account shareholders’ interests and carry out EM practices. Positive Accounting 
Theory point out that accounting choice depends on firm characteristics as it is used to help the relationship 




                                                          
(2010), managers manipulate accounting results to smooth out income flows, to minimise the 
tax burden, to carry out changes in the control of the company, to influence labour 
negotiations or to respond to takeover bids. Healy and Wahlen (1999) differentiated these 
motivations as contractual, political/governmental and value-based.  The consequences of 
these management practices can increase information asymmetry and reduce the value of the 
company, its reputation and its corporate image (Fombrun et al., 2000). We focus on the 
consequences of EM practices on the cost of capital and on company reputation. 
Cost of capital determines the viability of business models and affects investment 
decisions and the value of the company fundamentally.  A number of previous research 
papers have pointed out that the earnings quality decreases information asymmetries and the 
cost of capital (Francis et al., 2005, 2008a; Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Theory suggests that 
both investors and the market demand a higher rate of return from companies carrying out 
manipulative practices (Lambert et al., 2007) as these practices increases the perception of 
uncertainty about their financial health. Furthermore, EM overstate performance temporarily 
and it can be designed to benefit the myopic managers at a cost to long term investors and 
stakeholders and these agency costs get reflected in the cost of capital. On the other hand, 
top-quality financial information and little or no EM practices signals credibility and lowers 
the information asymmetry between managers and investors and hence, the cost of capital.   
We expect  to find a positive relationship between EM practices and cost of capital in 
line with earlier studies by Francis et al. (2004, 2005), Gray et al. (2009), and Blanco et al. 
(2009):  
H1a:  Earnings management practices increase the cost of capital. 
Reputation could be defined as “a perceptual representation of a company’s past 
actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents 
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when compared to other leading rivals” (Fombrun, 1996, p. 72). Corporate Reputation 
depends on the information received by the public about that company’s behavior, via the 
press, the market or the company itself (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). Fombrun et al. (2000) 
and Roychowdhury (2006) point out the negative impact of these discretionary accounting 
practices on the value of companies, their transactions, their reputation and their corporate 
image. It also leads to loss of support from investors and other stakeholders, increased 
activism and surveillance by interest groups and regulatory authorities, damage to corporate 
reputation and financing constraints (Fombrun et al., 2000). EM not only reduces the 
reputation of companies, it can also lead to loss of reputation of the individual managers 
responsible for overseeing the  reports  when accounting scandals or aggressive EM practices 
come to light (Zahra et al., 2005). These practices reflect managerial short-sightedness or 
desperation and influence the concerned parties’ opinion about the credibility of the 
management and the prospects of the company. Empirically, the effect of EM on corporate 
reputation has not been studied in depth but there is evidence of loss of reputation when small 
cases of fraud come to light (Francis et al., 2008b).  
Our next hypothesis is based on the above logic. We expect a negative relationship 
between EM and reputation: manipulative accounting practices have a detrimental effect on 
companies’ corporate reputation reflecting the loss of support from investors and non-
financial stakeholders. 
H1b: Earnings management practices decrease corporate reputation. 
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility, Cost of Capital and Corporate Reputation 
Companies can support the society by developing environmental protection systems and 
policies and implementing actions to promote relations with their customers, suppliers, 
employees and the community. CSR practices are appreciated as it generates positive 
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externality by going over and above legal requirements, i.e., they are not legally enforceable 
(Basu and Palazzo, 2008).  According to the Stakeholders Theory, alignment of company 
objectives with that of their stakeholder groups and the community creates a valuable 
intangible asset that works through various channels to help the company achieve stability 
and higher growth in the long term (Titman, 1984; Banerjee et al., 2008). The resource-based 
view of the firm points out that firm performance depends on the interplay of various tangible 
and intangible resources. Barney (1991) highlights that competitive advantage often depends 
on assets that are valuable, rare and inimitable and the firms that hold them should be 
organized to deploy these resources effectively. Stakeholder relationships developed over 
time and meet these very restrictive criteria and hence should be relevant to parties trying to 
evaluate long term prospects of the company. The Legitimacy Theory widens the 
Stakeholders Theory based on the argument that CSR is not only focused on stakeholders’ 
needs and alignment of interests, but on the principles coherent with some socially 
constructed system of norms, values and beliefs (Gray et al., 1995). Positive CSR strategies 
promote a climate of legitimacy and support among regulators and stakeholders. They also 
dissuade activism and intervention by interest groups and increase job satisfaction and 
customer loyalty (Hong and Andersen, 2011; Scholtens and Kang, 2012). Positive 
stakeholder relationship leads to loyalty and develops corporate reputation and these can get 
reflected in higher market share, profits and financial stability in the long term. These effects 
would work in the same way even if the stakeholders and investors have an incomplete 
understanding of meaningful CSR and the firm try to manipulate their perception to its 
advantage.  This gives influential profit-making entities, like large corporations, incentive to 
try to distort the process of evaluation of CSR practices so that they can score highly with 
little effort or commitment.  
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Due to these dynamics, the perception of long-term business risk is reduced for 
companies that promote and carry out positive social and environmental actions and this may 
lead to a lower the cost of capital (Gregory et al., 2011). El Ghoul et al. (2010) demonstrate 
that companies that implement good CSR policies have significantly lower cost of capital, 
and point out that investors and the market consider these companies less vulnerable and 
more trustworthy and they have a lower systematic risk. On the other hand, tobacco and 
nuclear power companies have a higher cost of capital as they are deemed risky due to the 
(possible) future costs to the community and a backlash effect on them.  
Following the above evidence and arguments, we expect the following relationship: 
H2a: Positive CSR strategies lead to a decrease in Cost of Capital. 
CSR practices are increasingly being recognised as a strategic investment to improve 
or maintain corporate reputation. According to the stakeholder theory, a company’s support 
to different stakeholder groups creates social capital, which help the company improve its 
financial stability and long-term performance (Carroll, 1979; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Post et al., 2002). Loyalty and long-term support of stakeholders reinforces and improves the 
valuable intangible asset summarised as reputation of the company (Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006). 
Williams and Barrett (2000) find evidence of a positive relationship between 
philanthropy and corporate reputation. CSR policies, when perceived as credible, improve the 
corporate image perceived by customers, suppliers, investors, banks and the market (Sen et 
al., 2006).  These results are supported by Brammer and Pavelin (2004), Lai et al. (2010) and 
Melo and Garrido-Morgado (2012) who empirically confirm a positive effect of CSR on 
reputation and point out that corporate reputation is influenced by a wide range of strategies 
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of which CSR practices have the most significant effect. In line with the previous arguments 
and evidence, we proposed the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Positive CSR strategies lead to an increase in corporate reputation.  
2.3 Can CSR practices be used as a Strategic Shield against Costs of Earnings 
Management Practices?  
 Corporations are profit making entities and very few would subscribe to the idea that 
they can be persuaded to commit to environment and social policies that benefit the 
community at a cost to the shareholders and the management. The optimistic view is that 
CSR practices are long term strategies that benefit all parties and shareholders, with a long 
horizon, should support them. However, the compensation structure of managers in most 
corporations is heavily based on current profits and stock price performance and it makes 
costly long-term strategies unattractive to them. The voluntary nature of these practices and 
their reporting allows the manager to design them to fit the their own interests rather than to 
benefit the community and stakeholders (Buhr et al., 2014).   Due to this, stakeholders often 
have a sceptical view on corporate claims about CSR practices (Bakan, 2005; Barnett, 2007 
Indeed, managers can simply try to manipulate the perception about their commitment to 
CSR at minimum cost for short term private benefits at a cost to the community and the long 
term investors. These practices have been referred to as ‘green-washing’ in the press. Gray 
(2006) questions the feasibility and even the desirability of shareholder value creation from 
positive social, environmental and sustainable practices and highlights the need to challenge 
the cosmetic adjustments that the current accounting system encourages. We have witnessed 
a steady growth in socially responsible investment funds in response to ethically motivated 
investors, but such funds are designed based on a reductionist view of sustainability that help 
businesses to perpetuate their profit motive (Entine, 2003; Hawken, 2004; Haigh, 2006). The 
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emphasis on CSR scores as a measure of overall sustainable practices by investment 
managers and stakeholders enables large corporations to play to their strengths and increase 
the numerical value by concentrating on components they can influence more easily and with 
lower cost with little or no real care about sustainability. Chatterji et al. (2009) studies the 
ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) which is most widely 
used in the US and find that they do not use publicly available data optimally and KLD 
environmental strengths are poor predictor of future pollution and compliance violation. 
However, since most socially responsible investment strategies are based on these ratings, the 
resulting investments would reduce cost of capital of firms with high CSR scores reinforcing 
the notion that CSR increases financial strengths and incentivise corporations to keep on 
using the cosmetic strategies.  
 Prior et al. (2008) and Gargouri et al. (2010) report that companies whose managers 
engage in aggressive accounting policies and EM are more likely to display ethical and social 
policies. A plausible explanation of this positive association is the managers’ aim of 
obtaining the support of stakeholders and reducing the risk of dismissal triggered by the 
negative effects of EM practices on the company’s value and reputation. Cespa and Cestone 
(2007) point out that perceived commitment to CSR could, in effect, help to ensure the 
continuity in their leadership position by empowering them to fight challenges to their control 
on the company, to undertake labour negotiations and avoid activism and boycotts by various 
stakeholder groups. Prior et al., (2008) show that CSR is often implemented as a defensive 
tool to avoid negative reactions and subsequent surveillance by the stakeholders who might 
be affected by EM, thereby entrenching the managers'  position in the company and allowing 
them to continue acting in their own interest (also see Surroca et al.,  2010).  
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The possibility that CSR can be used as a shielding or entrenchment strategy to help 
reduce the negative reaction to EM practices raises the following research question: is the 
market able to identify the possible use of CSR as a shielding strategy? The market might be 
able to see through this and penalize these companies leading to a higher cost of capital and 
lower reputation. But even though investors, market and stakeholders are aware of this 
possibility, they may not have the necessary information. Insiders might manage earnings to 
portray a more realistic picture of the financial health of the company, rather than generate 
short term private benefits.   Investors and interest groups might consider investments in CSR 
as a signal of the company’s long term strategy and might discount concerns arising purely 
from EM practices, resulting in a favorable effect on cost of capital and corporate reputation. 
In this scenario, CSR activities would not only improve financing constraint and reputation 
on its own, but can help compensate for loss of confidence from discretionary accounting 
choices. Because of this shielding effect, managers engaging in EM would find it worthwhile 
to pursue some degree of positive CSR even if they do not have a long term commitment. If 
the market sees through this attempt, the gains from investments in CSR would become 
unattractive to the myopic managers and they might prefer to use the limited resource to 
improve their bottom-line and accounting quality and we might not see an overall negative 
association between EM and CSR practices. But the extant literature portrays a consistent 
positive link between the two and that can be explained from the shielding effect of CSR 
against costs of EM practices. We test this argument using the following two hypotheses: 
H3a: Positive CSR practices can be used strategically to shield against the negative 
effect of earnings management on the cost of capital.  
H3b: Positive CSR practices can be used strategically to shield against the negative 
effect of earnings management on corporate reputation.  
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2.4 Institutional moderating factors: national approach to CSR and Investor 
Protection  
The operating environment of the corporations plays an important role in their 
decision making process and we try to capture these institutional factors. Institutional 
approaches towards CSR differ across countries as they evolve as a result of public pressure 
or the environmental normative context. According to Kolk and Perego (2008), social, 
political and regulatory pressure on a specific issue (in this case, CSR) in any country shapes 
the institutional structure regulating it. For instance, Van Tulder and Van der Zwart (2006) 
illustrate that the American focus on CSR is neo-liberal and that the essential role played by 
the government focuses on strongly emphasizing sanctions, rules and laws. This is an 
instrumental view of CSR. On the contrary, the system in Europe is designed to promote 
companies’ active role regarding CSR strategy and avoid the level of legal enforcement seen 
in the United States. As for Asia, the basic rules of CSR largely result from numerous 
enquiries of big companies, and are caused by the necessity of guaranteeing the international 
competitiveness of industries. Companies located in areas with strong expectations of 
voluntary CSR activities are more likely to be identified and penalized by the stakeholders 
and the market for unacceptable behavior that damage interests of investors and other 
stakeholders.  These will be reflected in the cost of capital and corporate reputation. Thus we 
expect to observe the following: 
H4: The national approach to CSR modifies the direct and shielding effect of CSR 
practices on Cost of Capital and Corporate Reputation. 
The level of investor protection in each country is also important in these relationships 
because it has been identified as one of the main institutional factors affecting corporate 
decision making (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Companies in countries with higher levels of 
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investor protection prioritize shareholder interests, often short term interests, and the effect of 
CSR on cost of capital and corporate reputation can diverge. On the other hand, agency 
problems are bigger in companies located in countries where investor protection is low (La 
Porta et al., 1999) and managers have more room to carry out EM. Accounting practices are 
less aggressive in countries with more investor protection (Haw et al, 2004, Chih et al., 2008; 
Scholtens and Kang, 2012), because institutional environments restrict managers’ ability to 
obtain private benefits (Leuz et al., 2003). Companies located in these countries may not 
identify CSR practices as a shielding strategy because their investors think that laws dealing 
with investor protection prevent the risk of expropriation by the management through EM.  
Following the argument of Prado Lorenzo et al. (2012) and Simnett et al. (2009) we 
would expect that countries with a lower level of investor protection tend to be more focused 
on relationship building with stakeholder groups and voluntarily assuming certain social 
responsibilities. A number of civil law countries, usually classified as countries with low 
investor protection have a community perspective and are characterized by laws aiming to 
protect worker’s and other concerned parties’ rights (Marginson and Sisson, 1994; Ferrer and 
Quintanilla, 1998). CSR practices might generate a stronger signal of a long term strategic 
planning and show a positive relation with firm value in these countries, but we do not expect 
to see CSR used as a shield against EM simply because investors have limited influence on 
the mangers. On the basis of the counteractive forces discussed above, we find that it is 
difficult to make consistent prediction about the effect of investor protection on the shielding 
effect of CSR influencing cost of capital and corporate reputation, but the coefficients on 
other relevant factors can be biased if we do not control for investor protection. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Population and sample  
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Our sample consists of 1,757 publicly listed non-financial companies for the period 
2006-2010 based in one of the 26 countries for which we have adequate data.2 This gives us 
an unbalanced panel of 8,785 firm years.  We use the following four publicly available 
databases to collect the required data: (1) Thomson One Analytic, for accounting and 
financial data; (2) the Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS), for data on CSR and 
Corporate Governance; and (3) I/B/E/S for analysts’ earnings and long term growth forecasts. 
The financial information is collected from consolidated statements of the sample of 
companies. Corporate Reputation is obtained from Fortune magazine (specifically, from the 
(4) World´s most admired companies ranking). 
3.2 Measurement of the Cost of Capital  
The cost of equity capital is the minimum rate of return equity investors require for 
providing capital to the firm (Botosan, 2006). We use the Price-Earnings-Growth (PEG) ratio 
as a measure of cost of equity capital based on the Easton (2004) model in a similar way as in 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Francis et al. (2008a), Blanco et al. (2009) and El Ghoul et al. 
(2011). Our dependent variable is based on the concept of expected Price-Earnings-Growth 
of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2003) that was operationalized by Easton (2004). This 
measure imposes the assumption of zero growth in abnormal earnings beyond the forecast 
horizon and is more useful since it isolates the effect of growth and cash flow (Hail and Leuz, 





where EPSt  is the expected earnings per share t years in the future and P0 is the 
current market price of  the firm’s stock.  Following Blanco et al. (2009), we use five years 
2 We count the special administrative region of Hong Kong as a separate country to reflect the fact that their 
corporate environment is different from that of mainland China. 
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long-term growth rates from I/B/E/S to calculate these earnings per share forecasts in year 4 
and 5. The model requires positive four-year-ahead and five-year-ahead earnings forecasts as 
well as positive change in the earnings forecast.  
 We use long-term earnings forecasts (𝐸𝑃𝑆5 and 𝐸𝑃𝑆4) as in Botosan and Plumee 
(2005),  rather than 𝐸𝑃𝑆2 and 𝐸𝑃𝑆1 because of if 𝐸𝑃𝑆2 is less than 𝐸𝑃𝑆1, we can not solve 
the model and limit our sample. However, since 𝐸𝑃𝑆5 always exceeds 𝐸𝑃𝑆4 this problem is 
avoided with the use of 𝐸𝑃𝑆5 and 𝐸𝑃𝑆4. They study different measures of cost of capital and 
conclude that the estimates based on the PEG ratio proposed by Easton (2004) are 
consistently and predictably related to market risk, leverage risk, information risk, firm size, 
book-to-price and growth. They argue that this ratio dominates the alternative measures of 
cost of capital and recommend that analysis that requires estimates of firm-specific cost of 
equity capital can rely on this measure. 
3.3 Measures of Corporate Reputation 
We compile the data on corporate reputation following a commonly used 
methodology based on the Fortune Index (Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2012; Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). The World´s most admired companies ranking for the period 2006-2010 
gives an alphabetical index of the most admired companies from the top 50 surveys and 
industry rankings for each year. This Fortune index is based on questionnaire responses from 
executives, outside directors and security analysts and companies are classified with respect 
to their competitors using eight attributes of reputation. In our analysis, REPUTATION is a 
dummy variable with the value of 1 for companies in the World´s most admired companies 
ranking in that year (and 0 otherwise).  
3.4 Measures of Earnings Management 
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We measure EM based on the discretionary component of accruals adjustment as this 
could be used as a measure of discretionary management, and therefore of accounting 
manipulation. The discretionary accruals adjustment (DAA) is obtained by subtracting the 
non-discretionary accruals adjustment (NDAA) from the total accruals adjustment (TAA). 
The DAA represents the abnormal accruals that proxy for EM. We use the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995) to separate the non-discretionary component of accruals from 
the total.  It is the most widely accepted and used method in the literature. The measurement 
procedure of EM practices is explained in detail in Appendix 1. We include dummies that 
identify the country of origin, because the size of the sample does not allow estimating 
models by sector and country efficiently. This procedure has been used by authors working 
with international sample of firms (see Prior et al., 2008 and Chih et al., 2008). 
3.5 Measurement of CSR practices 
CSR practices should be measured using a multidimensional construct addressing all 
the actions that have been carried out, especially in social and environmental contexts 
(Carroll, 1999). The CSR information is collected from the EIRIS database. 3  This database 
is widely used in the in the industry and in academic research, including Brammer et al. 
(2006), Scholtens and Dam (2007), Louche et al. (2012), Dam and Scholtens (2012) or 
Fabrizi et al. (2013). EIRIS assigns grades on specific attributes in the different areas. This 
procedure involves some subjective assessment of relevant practices of the firms but the 
topics and questions are designed in a way to give a reasonable assessment of the relevant 
activities. CSR is broken down into a wide range of relevant activities or policies and each 
item is assigned a value between -3 and +3. The first grade is major positive and has a value 
3  EIRIS is an independent research organization and a leading provider of non-financial information on 
companies’ environmental, social and ethical policy and practice. It provides comprehensive research on over 
3,000 companies globally. It offers consistent, comparable data on over 110 different ESG areas, including 
board practice, bribery and corruption, managing environmental and climate change impacts, human rights and 
supply chain labor standards - See more at: http://www.eiris.org/ 
18 
 
                                                          
of 3. The second is minor positive and has the value of 1. On the contrary, major negative has 
a value of -3 and minor negative, of -1. The EIRIS process starts with information disclosed 
by the companies. Then, targeted questionnaires are sent to companies regarding areas where 
public data are unclear. These results in considerable focused dialogue with companies that 
help clarify any concerns and refine their opinion. Sector specialists within each team review 
the research before the score is released. 
The CSR score is determined from the equally-weighted sum of items classified under 
environmental issues, human rights, relations with stakeholders and board composition. The 
first of these areas concerns items such as the company’s environmental management system 
and policy, its impact on the environment, and whether the company has published reports on 
this.  The second category is the general scope of the company’s strategy, policy, systems and 
reporting in the field of human rights. The third group concerns the company’s policy, 
management systems, quantitative information and  level of commitment with stakeholders in 
general, policy and practices to support equal opportunities and diversity, health systems and 
safety at work procedures, support to employee training and development, relationships with 
customers and suppliers and the level of commitment with the community or social projects. 
Finally, in order to reflect the characteristics of the Board of Directors, the Board Index 
includes: (i) the independence of the Board, as determined by the separation of functions 
between the chief executive and the chairman, and the percentage of independent members 
on the Board and on the audit committee; (ii) the diversity of these two bodies in terms of the 
presence of women and representatives of different stakeholders; (iii) other transparency and 
control practices such as the existence of codes of ethics, policies to prevent bribery and 
corruption, and transparency regarding remunerations. Appendix 2 explains the composition 
of the CSR index in detail. 
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3.6 Institutional context variables 
Following Hillier et al. (2011), we use three sub-indices of investor protection that 
stem from the country-level governance indices of La Porta et al. (1998): (i) DCL, which 
equals 1 if the firm is located in a common law country and zero if the firm is located in a 
civil law country; (ii) DAR, which equals 1 if the firm is located in a country with more anti-
director rights than the sample median, and zero otherwise; and (iii)  DEF, which equals 1 if 
the firm is located in a country with a higher than median law enforcement index, and zero 
otherwise. Law enforcement is formed by two indices of La Porta et al. (1998): efficiency of 
the judicial system, and law and order.  Finally, we proxy effective investor protection by 
summing the three dummy variables (DCL, DAR, and DEF). Based on this new variable 
measuring effective investor protection (the sum of DCL, DAR and DEF) which can take 
values between 0 and 3, we construct a new one, DINVPROTECTION. It equals 1 if the firm 
is located in a country with a higher than average effective investor protection, and zero 
otherwise. The countries with above average investor protection are Australia, Canada, Hong 
Kong, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
In addition, and following Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia Sanchez (2010), we included 
another dummy variable based on the National Corporate Responsibility Index (NCRI), 
which identifies the aggregate institutional context for CSR and examines both the extent to 
which there is an enabling national environment for corporate responsibility, and the resulting 
outcomes of corporate responsibility in practice. This index is based on the weighted sum of 
seven components: corporate governance structures, ethical business practices, progressive 
policy formulation, building human capital, engagement with civil society, contributions to 
public finance and finally, environmental management. Each component is based upon a 
number of indicators and the basket of indicators is equally weighted, to give average scores 
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from 0-100 for each component. Similarly, each of the seven components is equally weighted 
on the basis that they are all of equal importance to the development of a responsible 
economy. The results give an overall NCRI, again with a maximum possible score of 100. 
For our purpose, our dummy variable, DNCRI, has the value of 1 if the company’s country of 
origin has an above the average NCRI, and 0 otherwise.  The countries with an above average 
NCRI are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. . 
 
3.7 Control variables 
Cost of capital and corporate reputation depend on a number of firm characteristics and 
without them any analysis would suffer from omitted variable biases. We control for size, 
leverage, risk, operating liquidity, industry and R&D intensity in our econometric models. 
Company size (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of the total assets. In general, larger 
companies enjoy better reputation (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004) and a lower cost of capital 
(Hail and Leuz, 2006). This variable is widely used as a control variable in studies involving 
EM (without a consensus on its effect) and CSR studies (Prior et al., 2008).  The level of firm 
leverage (DEBT) represents the debt or non-compliance risk (Prior et al., 2008; Surroca et al., 
2010). Other things remaining equal, leverage leads to an increase of the cost of equity 
capital.  RISK represents the level of systematic risk and is measured by the Beta of the 
market model. The CAPM suggests that systematic risk is priced and hence the beta risk is 
positively associated with the cost of capital. It is used by authors as Blanco et al. (2010) to 
determine its effect on the cost of capital. WORKINGCAPITAL is defined as the difference 
between current assets and current liabilities. It reflects liquidity, i.e. a company’s ability to 
proceed normally with its activities in the short term. Companies with financial problems, 
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which might be reflected as negative working capital and excess debt, may be more inclined 
to manipulate accounting numbers (Park and Shin, 2004). A large body of research shows 
that financial resources also have a strong positive association with CSR practices.  Sector 
effect is captured using a set of categorical variables (INDUSTRY) based on the industry 
codes. According to Melo and Garrido-Morgado (2012), the impact of CSR on Corporate 
Reputation is moderated by the firm’s industry. Moreover, it may affect its CSR practices 
(Chen and Bouvain, 2009). We have separate dummies for segments classed as Business 
materials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples products, Health Care, Industrial Field, 
Information Technology and Utilities. Finally, R&DINTENSITY is measured by the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total revenue. Baber et al. (1991) and Dechow and Sloan (1991) among 
others show that companies that invest the most in R&D have greater incentives toward EM, 
in order to achieve their goals project targets. On the other hand, McWilliams and Siegel 
(2001) point out that CSR is also dependent on R&D costs. Firms that invest in R&D create 
intangible assets which promote higher corporate reputation (Torres et al., 2012). 
 
 
 3.8 Empirical Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to determine the effect of EM and CSR practices on the cost 
of capital and on corporate reputation, especially when CSR practices are carried out 
strategically to avoid negative reaction of the market and stakeholder groups to the managers’ 
result-based management.  In the first set of models (model As), the dependent variable is the 




For the analyses of cost of capital we estimate Arellano and Bond (1991) 
simultaneous equations model for panel data using the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) method. It helps to address endogeneity problems that persist in least squares 
estimators. Following the argument of Wooldridge (2010), our tests could be biased due to 
endogeneity because, while the EM and CSR practices could partially explain rPEG, expected 
cost of capital can influence the choice of EM and CSR. Estimation using instrumental 
variables models like the GMM can address this problem (Ogaki, 1993). Endogeneity 
problem can also be controlled using a simultaneous-equations estimator, such as maximum 
likelihood or two or three-stage least squares estimators, but the choice should be based on 
consistency (De Miguel et al., 2005). These methods are more efficient than GMM, but they 
are not consistent and generate biased results as they do not eliminate unobservable 
heterogeneity: firms’ own specificity that gives rise to a particular behaviour. These 
differences between individuals are potentially correlated with the explanatory variables (also 
called individual specific effects like entrepreneurial skills, corporate culture, etc.), which are 
invariant over time and directly influence corporate decisions. In order to control 
unobservable heterogeneity, GMM decomposes the random error term (εi) into two parts: the 
combined effect (μit), which varies depending on individuals and on time periods; and the 
individual effect (ηi), which is characteristic of the company.  
We use Logit model for panel data in order to test our hypotheses about corporate 
reputation. As mentioned above, REPUTATION is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
the company is listed in the World´s most admired companies ranking, and of 0 if it is not. 
Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable, the best option is using nonlinear 
probability models, where a result between 0 and 1 is guaranteed for the estimation.  
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First, we test H1a and H1b by running both sets of models with EM as the main 
variable of interest.  
rPEG/REPUTATIONit= ø1EMit + ø2Sizeit + ø3Debtit + ø4Riskit + ø5Workingcapitalit + 
ø6Industryit + ø7R&DIntensityit + εit      [1A/B] 
Then we focus on the effect of CSR practices on the cost of capital and on the 
company reputation (H2a and H2b).  
rPEG/REPUTATIONit= ø1CSRit + ø2Sizeit + ø3Debtit + ø4Riskit + ø5Workingcapitalit + 
ø6Industryit + ø7R&DIntensityit + εit      [2A/B] 
In order to test the shielding effect of CSR practices (H3a and H3b), in we interact 
EM practices and CSR actions. So we have both CSR and EM practices and their interaction 
as independent variables in the models. 
rPEG/REPUTATIONit= ø1EMit + ø2CSRit + ø3CSR*EMit + ø4Sizeit + ø5Debtit + ø6Riskit + 
ø7Workingcapitalit + ø8Industryit + ø9R&DIntensityit + εit       [3A/B] 
In order to identify the institutional factors moderating the combined effect of CSR 
and EM on rPEG and REPUTATION (H4), we estimate two new models to determine the role 
of: (i) the national approach to CSR, and (ii) the level of investor protection in the firm’s 
country of origin: 
rPEG/REPUTATIONit= ø1EMit + ø2CSRit + ø3CSR*EMit + ø4CSR*EM*DNCRIit + ø5DNCRIit 
+ ø6Sizeit + ø7Debtit + ø8Riskit + ø9Workingcapitalit + ø10Industryit + ø11R&DIntensityit i + εit 
            [4A/B] 
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rPEG/REPUTATIONit= ø1EMit + ø2CSRit + ø3CSR*EMit + ø4CSR*EM*DINVPROTECTIONit 
+ ø5DINVPROTECTIONIt + ø6Sizeit + ø7Debtit + ø8Riskit + ø9Workingcapitalit + ø10Industryit 
+ ø11R&DIntensityit +εit         [5A/B] 
where: 
i, represents the company and t represents the time period. 
ø, represents estimating parameters. 
εit, represents the error term.  
rPEG is a continuous variable measured by the Cost of Capital. 
REPUTATION is a dummy variable that represents whether the firm is one of the most 
admired companies worldwide or not. 
EM is a continuous variable that represents the accounting EM practices.   
CSR is a continuous variable that reflects the CSR practices of the company. 
CSR*EM  is a continuous variable measured by the interaction between CSR and EM, that 
represents companies using CSR practices as an entrenchment strategy that conceals EM 
practices. 
DNCRI and DINVPROTECTION are dummy variables that reflect the characteristics of the 
institutional and corporate contexts. These variables are analysed by their interaction with 
CSR*EM. 
SIZE is a continuous variable measured by the logarithm of the total assets. 
DEBT is a continuous variable measured as the ratio of debt to equity. 
RISK is a continuous variable measured by the beta market. 
WORKINGCAPITAL is a continuous variable measured by the difference between current 
assets and current liabilities. 
INDUSTRY is a multinomial variable that represents the sector of activity. 
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R&DINTENSITY is a continuous variable measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to total 
revenue. 
    4. RESULTS 
 4.1 Univariate analysis 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean 
value of cost of capital is of 1.88 basis points and its standard deviation, of ± 2.26 basis 
points. The value is much smaller than expected because the expected earnings growth is 
exceptionally small in our sample period.  Considering cost of capital as the minimum rate of 
return on equity investors for providing capital to the firm (Botosan, 2006), this mean value 
means that, on average, companies sample must provide to their shareholders at 1.88 basis 
point of return for their investments. Furthermore, its standard deviation of ± 2.26 basis 
points means that this return on equity varies according to the risk-return principle (higher 
risk, higher demanded return). The mean value of the CSR variable is -22.74 (out of a 
possible range between -84 to +84), implying that, on average, practices are not socially 
responsible. The standard deviation is of ±27.331. Out of the four groups of CSR categories, 
the greatest concern in our sample of companies’ is board issues followed by environmental 
issues and human rights. The individual analysis of each item reveals that the most 
commonly implemented CSR practices concern relationships with customers and suppliers, 
and the use of environmental management systems. The companies in the sample have an 
average of 0.007 in EM. The proxy for  EM is the discretionary accrual adjustments, which is 
the residual in the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) as explained in Appendix 1 
and it can take positive or negative values. It is not surprising that the average is close to the 
ideal level of EM, which is zero implying that companies, on average, do not display 
significant EM practices. However, the relatively high standard deviation of 0.375 indicates 
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that there is a wide variation EM practices in our sample. The mean values and standard 
deviations are very similar to those obtained in previous studies, such as Barton (2001), Prior 
et al. (2008) and Gray et al. (2009). The average SIZE of the analysed companies is 7.874 
million Euros, with a standard deviation of ±1.979 million Euros. The average DEBT stands 
at 0.676 with a standard deviation of ±0.110. Table 1 also shows the absolute and relative 
frequency of REPUTATION, a dummy variable with values between 0 and 1. Only 645 
companies (7.38% of the sample) are listed in the World´s most admired companies ranking, 
which is conceived as a reputation index in Fortune magazine.  
[Insert Table 1 around here]  
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the different variables. 
The coefficients are not very high between the different independent variables indicating that 
there are no significant multicollinerity problems that might confound the estimation. 
    [Insert Table 2 around here]  
Table 3 shows the mean values of CSR, EM and institutional factors per country. An 
individual analysis permit us observe the differences among countries. USA, with 2324 
observations out of  the total of 8786, is the most represented country in the sample, closely 
followed by Japan (with 1881 observations) and the United Kingdom (1634 observations). 
We note that Netherlands, Finland and France are the most socially responsible countries and 
Germany has the highest mean value of discretionary accruals. The table also indicates the 
group of countries with stronger commitment to CSR and investor protection. 
[Insert Table 3 around here]  
4.2 Earnings Management, Corporate Social Responsibility and Cost of Capital.  
The empirical evidence reflecting the effect of EM, CSR and the entrenchment 
strategy on the cost of capital is shown in Table 4. Column 1 shows results for model 1A and 
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we find that the effect of EM on the cost of capital is positive and significant at 1% level 
which supports hypothesis H1a. Companies' engaging in EM practices is penalized by the 
market with a higher cost of capital. In column 2 (model 2A), CSR practices show a negative 
relationship with the cost of capital at a 5% significance. This shows that companies that 
invest in CSR have lower costs of capital (H2a). Both results hold in the specification in the 
models presented in columns 3, 4 and 5. Both effects are economically significant. For 
example, from the coefficients in model 5 (A), we see that for an average firm, if EM 
becomes one standard deviation more aggressive, cost of capital increases by 17%.  
The shielding effect of CSR activities on the negative effect of EM (model 3A) is very 
significantly negative on the cost of capital (99% confidence level). This suggests that 
investors get mixed signal when CSR is used along with EM and required cost of capital does 
not rise as sharply as a result of EM in these companies (H3A).  
The effect of the interaction of EM, CSR and DNCRI, which reflects the effectiveness 
of shielding practices in countries with strong commitments to CSR, is positive and 
significant. Thus if investors and the market in general demand a strong commitment to CSR, 
trying to use CSR to shield EM can backfire and increase the cost of capital even more. Thus, 
hypothesis H4 can be accepted. The result of the interaction of EM, CSR and 
DINVPROTECTION (model 5A,column 5) is negative and significant  Therefore, managers 
use CSR practices as a means of disguising EM successfully when they work in companies 
operating in contexts where investor interests and rights tend to be more protected by law.  
[Insert Table 4 around here]  
Observing the coefficient of the control variables, the very significant negative effect of 
the company size stands out. This indicates that investors of big companies demand lower 
cost of capital for their investments. WORKINGCAPITAL has a positive effect on the 
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dependent variable of model A when the effect of EM and CSR in the cost of capital is 
individually analyzed. However, the coefficient of the interaction of the shielding effect and 
investor protection is negative implying that the shielding effect is weaker in countries with 
strong investor protection. The other variables mostly show expected signs, but are not 
significant in the majority of the models. 
 
 
4.3 Earnings Management, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Reputation.  
Table 5 shows the results of the Logit models designed to capture the effect of EM, 
CSR and shielding strategy on corporate reputation. The link between EM practices and 
reputation (model 1B) is negative and highly significant supporting H1B. We obtain exactly 
opposite sign (at 1% significance) when analyzing the consequences of CSR practices on 
reputation. Therefore, we can accept hypothesis H2b. The negative link between EM and 
reputation and the positive one between CSR and reputation are present in the rest of models 
(2B, 3B, 4B and 5B). We find that the interaction term EM*CSR is insignificantly different 
from zero, implying that positive CSR strategies in itself improves reputation, but it does not 
help reclaim additional ground lost to firms that display EM practices. Therefore, hypothesis 
H3b is not supported by the data. In addition, interest groups lightly punish shielding 
practices when implemented in contexts strongly committed with CSR (model 4B) and in 
countries with weak protection of investors' interests and rights (model 5B). The control 
variables show patterns that are similar to the previous table as we observe that reputation is 




[Insert Table 5 around here]  
4.4 Robustness tests 
We estimate the models (cost of capital and reputation) after partitioning the full 
sample into two groups based on whether the firms are based in a common law or a civil law 
country. We observe that 46.67% of observations belong to a civil law country. Table 6 
shows the effect of EM, CSR, and entrenchment for the subsample of civil or common law 
countries separately. In both institutional contexts EM result in significantly higher cost of 
capital, while CSR strategy generates a decrease in it. But the direct effect of CSR is only 
significant in the case of civil law countries. The most significant difference between the 
results in the two samples is seen in the shielding effect of EM. Strategic use of CSR to shield 
the effect of EM seems to work well in common law countries, but backfires in civil law 
countries. The results of the model for corporate reputation shows similar pattern, but the 
significance is completely lost except for the direct impact of CSR and EM in common law 
countries. 
[Insert Table 6 around here]  
        
4.5 Discussion of the overall picture from the results 
We show that cost of capital can be influenced by financial and strategic decisions, a 
result consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2011). Market risk and uncertainty stemming from 
mistrust towards companies that manipulate their results leads to a higher required rate of 
return. Companies with a greater level of discretionary management of accruals face higher 
costs of capital, ceteris paribus. We also show that investors require a lower return if 
companies promote CSR practices, a result consistent with the findings by El Ghoul et al. 
(2010) and Gregory et al. (2011). These companies are considered to have a long term plan in 
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developing loyalty and community relationship and are considered as financially more stable 
and less vulnerable to activism.  We also demonstrate that CSR can be strategically used by 
managers to lower the negative impact of questionable accounting practices and protect 
themselves against big rise in cost of capital and fall in reputation, a result comparable to the 
effectiveness of social policies in the context of marketing (Handelman and Arnold, 1999). 
Our results showing that EM practices have a negative effect on corporate reputation are 
consistent with previous evidence by Fombrun et al. (2000) and Roychowdhury (2006) 
among others. The market and other stakeholders negatively value managers who carry out 
aggressive accounting practices for short term personal gains against the interest of 
shareholders, investors and non financial stakeholders. These discretionary practices cause 
the loss of support from the affected stakeholders and increase their activism (Zahra et al., 
2005).  
On the other hand, a well rounded CSR strategy helps to improve the perception of 
shareholders, banks, regulation agencies, customers, suppliers, media and the community and 
we show that this is reflected in corporate reputation and financing costs. We also find that 
CSR can help firms recover credibility lost through EM practices.  When combined with 
CSR, EM practices are ignored, or not punished significantly, by the investors and the non 
financial stakeholders.  This strikes a chord with Prior et al. (2008) and Gargouri et al. 
(2010), who point out that CSR improves a company’s corporate image irrespective of the 
ultimate goal pursued by the managers. The validity and consistency of CSR scores, widely 
used in the ethical investments sector and academic research, is a hotly contested issue. 
Delmas et al. (2013) and Chatterji et al. (2014) finds a lack of consistency among CSR scores 
provided by different organizations covering US companies and point out the lack of 
transparency in the evaluation process and the dangers in putting too much trust in any one of 
them. Our results are based on the most widely used measure of CSR covering a large 
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number of international companies and we agree that our measure of CSR also suffer from 
the same caveat. But as long as markets fixate on widely used CSR scores as a measure of 
business ethics and sustainable practices, corporations might be able to use these very noisy 
and questionable scores as a tool to generate positive sentiments from ethical investors and 
loyalty from stakeholders. Institutional context (national commitment to CSR and the level of 
investor protection in the company’s country of origin) plays an important role to moderate 
the relationship between, EM, CSR and cost of capital (corporate reputation). These results 
support previous evidence by Scholtens and Kang (2012) and Leuz et al. (2003). 
5. Concluding remarks 
In recent years, accounting practices and ethical standards of companies are scrutinized 
intensely by investors and non-financial stakeholders. Investments in CSR can give 
competitive advantage in the product market and, in general, can signal a company’s healthy 
long-term outlook. But does it provide managers with an opportunity to use CSR practices for 
significant improvement in the corporate image? We show that CSR can be used to shield the 
negative effect of discretionary accounting practices on cost of capital. Corporations not only 
obtain direct economic and financial benefits from implementation of CSR policies, it also 
helps to cover up for EM practices. The markets cannot identify situations when CSR policies 
have a higher probability of being used as a short term strategy to improve corporate image. 
They have a negative effect on cost of capital by itself and they also reduce the rise in cost to 
companies that simultaneously engage in EM. We also find that the favorable effect of CSR 
is more pronounced in countries with strong investor protection. The shielding effect does not 
work in countries that have strong commitment to CSR and it is expected. A more thorough 
country and institution specific analysis needs to be done to understand how the relevant 
policies influence corporate strategies. 
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The results on corporate reputation are similar to the findings on the direct effect of 
EM and CSR on cost of capital. The stakeholders identify aggressive accounting practices 
and the reputation of these companies takes a hit as a result.  However, companies that 
promote responsibility to social and environmental causes strongly have higher reputation. 
These companies are more likely to be listed among the world’s most admired companies. 
But the market is more conservative in their assessment of CSR in countries with strong 
investor protection and an environment of higher commitment to CSR and possibly takes 
account that companies might try to use CSR policies primarily to hide their EM. We 
partition the sample into civil and common law countries to re-iterate how the effect of CSR 
and EM can be influenced by the legal environment in which the company operates.  
 Our findings contribute to the emerging literature attempting to understand the 
motivation of discretionary practices by managers. The highlight of the paper is the result that 
mangers might be able to shield their companies from punishment for EM practices by 
projecting their CSR policies. This is consistent with the Legitimacy Theory and the 
Stakeholder theory which explain how businesses can benefit by aligning with values 
constructed by the society. In this situation, managers may attempt to manipulate the 
perception about their image using CSR strategies at the margin and future research should 
try to identify if some groups of firms have an insincere box-ticking CSR strategy while 
others seem to show real commitment. We show that the positive effects of CSR not only 
affects long term loyalty of stakeholders through reputation, it brings home benefits instantly 
in the shape of lower cost of capital, and company insiders and large shareholders should aim 
to design compensation contract for executives that encourage them to invest in CSR. This 
basic result can help investors, stakeholders and regulatory authorities evaluate the 
implications of EM and CSR practices being carried out concurrently and inform them of the 
possibility that CSR can be used to shield negative perception about the company. In 
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particular, they should demand higher levels of transparency and accountability and look 
beyond the reductionist measures of CSR and sustainability. The different measures 
themselves show a significant variability among themselves and they can be used to 
manipulate perception, confuse and misinform while the real concerns on sustainability and 
ecology takes a back seat in corporate strategy (Milne and Gray, 2013). This paper shows 
evidence of such strategies and as pointed out by Buhr et al. (2014), more research should be 
done to understand managerial priorities in their CSR strategies and snowball big reforms in 






































APPENDIX 1: Measuring Earnings Management with Discretionary Accruals 
Jones’ standard model  
Following Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995), total accrual adjustments (TAA) are defined as:        𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 = [(∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡) − (∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡)] − [(∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡) − ( ∆𝑅𝐿𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡)] − 𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡  (a.1) 
 where ∆CAit represents the change in current assets; ∆CASHit reflects the change in cash held and in short-
term financial investments; ∆CLit is the change in current liabilities; ∆RLTPit is the change in reclassified long 
term obligations; DAit is the depreciation and amortization; i represents the company; and t represents the year. 
On the basis of equation (a.1), accruals are calculated using an explanatory model. The difference between 
actual and expected accrual adjustments (taking into account growth, company assets and the accounting result) 
represents the discretionary or unexplained component of accrual adjustments (DAA). It acts as a measurement 
of management discretion in the reporting of results. 
 The standard Jones model uses the following procedure to separate the discretionary component and the 
non-discretionary one: 
𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼1,𝑡 � 1𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛼2,𝑡 �∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 � +  𝛼3,𝑡 �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝑡   (a.2) 
where 𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 are the total accrual adjustments; 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1represents the total assets of firm i in period t-1 (this is 
used as a deflator to correct possible problems of heteroscedasticity); 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡represents the property, plant and 
equipment of firm i in period t; and ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the change in sales for firm i in period t. 
The non-discretionary accrual adjustments (NDAA) are 𝛼1,𝑡 � 1𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛼2,𝑡 �∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 � + 𝛼3,𝑡 �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1� , and 𝜀𝑡 
represents the discretionary accrual adjustments (DAA) for firm i in year t. NDAA are calculated by replacing 
the coefficients in equation (a.2) with the values obtained by Ordinary Least Squares. DAA are the residuals of 
this calculation. 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
In the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995, equation a.3), the TAA use the variation in sales minus 
accounts receivable (used to measure the company’s growth, because its working capital is closely linked to 
sales) and minus the item property, plant and equipment (used to measure the depreciation costs of the 
discretionary adjustments). It is assumed that not all sales are necessarily non-discretionary, and that this will 
depend on the item to be received. 
𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼1,𝑡 � 1𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝛼2,𝑡 �∆(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠−𝐴∗𝑅)𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 � + 𝛼3,𝑡 �𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝑡  (a.3) 
    where A*R represents accounts receivable, and the other variables are defined as in equation (a.2).  
Please note that coefficients in this model are calculated using the original Jones model (1991), and the 






APPENDIX 2: Corporate Social Responsibility 
Figure 1 represents the composition of the CSR index, and analyzes several areas (environment, human rights, 







Figure 1. CSR PRACTICES 
ENVIRONMENTAL INDEX 
Environmental policies and commitment 
Environmental management systems 
Environmental reporting 
Level of  environmental impact improvement 
HUMAN RIGHTS INDEX 
Extent of policies addressing human rights issues 
Extent of systems addressing human rights issues 
Extent of reporting addressing human rights issues 
STAKEHOLDER INDEX 
Policies towards stakeholders overall 
Management systems for stakeholders overall 
Quantitative reporting for stakeholders overall 
Level of engagement with stakeholders overall 
Policies on equal opportunities and diversity issues 
Systems and practices to support equal opportunities and diversity issues 
Health & Safety systems 
Systems and practices to advance job creation and security 
Systems to manage employee relations 
Systems to support employee training and development 
Policies on maintaining good relations with customers - suppliers 
Systems to maintain good relations with customers - suppliers 
Level of commitment with community or charitable work 
BOARD INDEX 
The company separates the roles of the Chairman and the Chief Executive 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors exceeds 33% 
The company has an audit committee with a majority of independent non-executive directors 
Level of stakeholder issues allocated to members 
Gender diversity in the boardroom 
Policies and procedures on bribery and corruption (policies, system and reporting) 
Level of comprehension of the code of ethics 
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rPEG 0.0188 0.0226 
CSR -22.74 27.331 
ENVIRONMENTAL INDEX -2.53 7.875 
HUMAN RIGHTS INDEX -7.19 3.770 
STAKEHOLDER INDEX -13.02 18.891 
BOARD INDEX 2.52 9.640 
EM  0.007 0.375 
SIZE 7.874 1.979 
DEBT 0.676 0.110 
RISK 1.212 8.265 
WORKING CAPITAL 627.449 2840.651 
INDUSTRY 2.894 1.703 
R&D INTENSITY 0.179 4.909 
  REPUTATION 645 firm years (7.38% are  World´s most admired) 
Sample 8785 observations, 2006-010, 26 countries 
rPEG  represents the implied cost of capital measured by the model by Easton (2004EM) represents the Earnings 
Management practices measured by the Dechow et al. (1995) model. CSR shows the CSR practices of company i for 
period t.  Size represents the size of the company and is measured by the logarithm of its total assets. Debt shows the 
debt of the company and is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity. Risk represents the faced risk measured by the beta. 
Working_Capital represents liquidity, measured as the difference between current assets and current liabilities.  
Industry represents the economic sector of the company. R&DIntensity represents the ratio showing the R&D 
expenditure in comparison with the total of sales. REPUTATION is a dummy variable that represents whether the 
company is one of the most admired ones worldwide or not. 
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 Table 2. Pairwise Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. rPEG 1 
          
2. REPUTATION  -0.008 1 
         
3. EM -0.074 0.035 1 
        
4. CSR -0.296 0.156 0.192 1 
       
5. DNCRI 0.081 -0.010 -0.028 -0.205 1 
      
6. DINVPROTECTION 0.020 -0.089 -0.023 -0.110 0.040 1 
     
7. Size -0.421 0.228 0.059 0.393 -0.371 -0.042 1 
    
8. Debt -0.020 0.117 -0.020 -0.049 0.001 -0.008 0.035 1 
   
9. Risk 0.005 -0.027 -0.001 0.120 0.171 0.118 0.056 0.004 1 
  
10. Working_capital -0.195 0.192 0.086 0.270 -0.131 0.052 0.192 0.049 0.088 1 
 
11. R&DIntensity 0.044 -0.106 0.019 0.114 0.020 0.079 0.127 0.052 -0.079 0.009 1 
rPEG  represents the implied cost of capital measured by the model by Easton (2004). REPUTATION is a dummy variable that represents whether the company is one of the most admired ones 
worldwide or not. EM represents the Earnings Management practices measured by the Dechow et al. (1995) model. CSR shows the CSR score of company i for period t.  Size represents the size of 
the company and is measured by the logarithm of its total assets. Debt shows the debt of the company and is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity. Risk represents the faced risk measured by the 
beta. Working_Capital represents liquidity, measured as the difference between current assets and current liabilities.  R&DIntensity represents the ratio showing the R&D expenditure in 







Table 3. Descriptive Statistics per country 
 Observations CSR EM DNCRI DINVPROTECTION 
Australia 338 -5.666 0.069 1 1 
Austria 48 -18.188 -0.047 0 0 
Belgium 57 -0.404 -0.038 0 0 
Canada 324 -16.765 0.549 1 1 
China 32 -54.938 0.0001 0 0 
Denmark 59 1.237 2.908 1 0 
Finland 97 11.628 4.549 1 0 
France 334 10.937 0.743 0 0 
Germany 318 -11.321 88.747 1 0 
Greece 24 1.167 0.001 0 0 
Hong-Kong 394 -48.690 9.459 0 1 
Ireland 39 -25.026 0.232 1 0 
Italy 123 4.919 17.426 0 0 
Japan 1881 -20.074 0.034 0 0 
Luxembourg 6 -37.000 0.029 1 0 
Netherlands 78 15.231 0.678 1 0 
New Zealand 44 -11.727 0.018 1 1 
Norway 53 10.208 0.018 1 0 
Portugal 23 6.261 0.018 0 0 
Singapore 185 -47.189 0.821 0 0 
South Korea 20 17.100 0.034 0 0 
Spain 108 0.639 0.048 0 0 
Sweden  120 3.250 0.063 1 0 
Switzerland 122 -0.746 -0.002 1 0 
UK 1634 -8.139 8.048 1 1 
USA 2324 -20.789 11.129 0 1 
EM represents the Earnings Management practices measured by the Dechow et al. (1995) model. CSR shows the 
CSR practices of company i for period t.  DNCRI equals 1 if the company’s country of origin has an above the 
average National level Corporate Responsibility and DINVPROTECTION equals 1 if the firm is located in a 



















Table 4. The combined effect EM and CSR  Practices  on cost of capital (MODEL A: Cost of capital, Arellano Bond 
GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


































DINVPROTECTION     
-4.800 
(0.957) 






























































Z 30453.750 61.470 546.290 4853.920 636.230 
m1 -3.080 -2.80 -2.840 -2.850 -2.850 
m2 1.280 1.500 1.420 1.410 1.410 
Hansen 102.560 55.140 90.470 115.840 96.820 
The Dependent variable is rPEG, a proxy for cost of capital. EM represents the Earnings Management practices measured by the Dechow et al. (1995) model.  CSR 
reflects the CSR score of company i for period t.  CSR*EM represents the use of CSR practices as a shielding strategy with the aim to disguise EM.  
CSR*EM*DNCRI represents shielding practices in countries with strong commitment to CSR. DNCRI is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company’s 
country of origin National Corporate Responsibility Index (NCRI)  is above average (and of 0 otherwise).  CSR*EM*DINVPROTECTION represents shielding 
practices in countries with strong laws and enforcement to protect shareholders’ interests. DINVPROTECTION is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm 
is located in a country higher than the mean investor protection, and of 0 otherwise. Size represents the size of the company and is measured by the logarithm of its 
total assets.  Debt reflects the debt of the company and is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity.  Risk represents the faced risk, measured by the beta.  
WorkingCapital represents liquidity, measured as the difference between current assets and current liabilities. Industry represents the economic sector of the 
company.  R&DIntensity represents the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. We report the coefficients (p-values) for each explanatory variables. 
rPEGit =ø + ø1EMit + ø2Sizeit + ø3Debtit + ø4Riskit + ø5Workingcapitalit + ø6Industryyit + ø7R&DIntensityit + + ηi + μit                    [1.A] 
rPEGit = ø + ø1CSRit + ø2Sizeit + ø3Debtit + ø4Riskit + ø5Workingcapitalit + ø6Industryyit + ø7R&DIntensityit + + ηi + μit         [2.A] 
rPEGit = ø + ø1EMit + ø2DCSRit + ø3DCSR*EMit + ø4Sizeit + ø5Debtit + ø6Riskit + ø7Workingcapitalit + ø8Industryit + ø9R&DIntensityit + ηi + μit                                [3.A] 
rPEGit = ø + ø1EMit + ø2CSRit +  ø4CSR*EM*DNCRIit + ø5DNCRI + ø6Sizeit + ø7Debtit + ø8Riskit + ø9Workingcapitalit + ø10Industryit + ø11R&DIntensityit +ηi + μit                                      [4.A] 












Table 5.  The combined effect EM and CSR Practices on Corporate Reputation (MODEL B: Reputation; Logit models) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























DNCRI    
-21.69E+6*** 
(0.000)  




DINVPROTECTION     
3.17E+4*** 
(0.000) 






































































The Dependent variable is REPUTATION a proxy for corporate reputation. EM represents the Earnings Management practices measured by the Dechow et al. 
(1995) model.  CSR reflects the CSR score of company i for period t.  CSR*EM represents the use of CSR practices as a shielding strategy with the aim to 
disguise EM.  CSR*EM*DNCRI represents shielding practices in countries with strong commitment to CSR. DNCRI is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if 
the company’s country of origin National Corporate Responsibility Index (NCRI)  is above average (and of 0 otherwise).  CSR*EM*DINVPROTECTION 
represents shielding practices in countries with strong laws and enforcement to protect shareholders’ interests. DINVPROTECTION is a dummy variable with the 
value of 1 if the firm is located in a country higher than the mean investor protection, and of 0 otherwise. Size represents the size of the company and is measured 
by the logarithm of its total assets.  Debt reflects the debt of the company and is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity.  Risk represents the faced risk, measured 
by the beta.  WorkingCapital represents liquidity, measured as the difference between current assets and current liabilities.  Industry represents the economic 
sector of the company. R&DIntensity represents the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales. We report the coefficients (p-values) for each explanatory variables. 
REPUTATIONit= ø + ø1EMit + ø2Sizeit + ø3Debtit + ø4Riskit + ø5Workingcapitalit + ø6Industryyit + ø7R&DIntensityit + + ηi + μit                                                                                                                           [1.B] 
REPUTATIONit= ø + ø1CSRit + ø2Sizeit + ø3Debtit + ø4Riskit + ø5Workingcapitalit + ø6Industryyit + ø7R&DIntensityit + + ηi + μit                                                                                                                           [2.B] 
REPUTATIONit= ø + ø1EMit + ø2DCSRit + ø3DCSR*EMit + ø4Sizeit + ø5Debtit + ø6Riskit + ø7Workingcapitalit + ø8Industryit + ø9R&DIntensityit + ηi + μit                                                                                                       [3.B] 
REPUTATIONit= ø + ø1EMit + ø2CSRit +  ø4CSR*EM*DNCRIit + ø5DNCRI + ø6Sizeit + ø7Debtit + ø8Riskit + ø9Workingcapitalit + ø10Industryit + ø11R&DIntensityit +ηi + μit                                                         [4B] 















Table 6. Robust Analysis. Civil Vs Common Law.  The combined effect EM and CSR Practices on the Cost of 
Capital and Corporate Reputation 
 MODEL A: COST OF CAPITAL MODEL B: CORPORATE REPUTATION 
 
 
COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW 
 Coef. P> |Z| Coef. P> |Z| Coef. P> |Z| Coef. P> |Z| 
EM 0.266*** 0.000 0.0131*** 0.000 -140.500 0.758 -8951.300* 0.071 
CSR -0.506 0.635 -3.480*** 0.000 2617.800 0.460 53.2E+3*** 0.000 
CSR*EM -7.77E-03*** 0.000 3.85E-04*** 0.000 1.890 0.867 -117.000 0.104 
Size -217.700*** 0.000 -170.790*** 0.000 91.15E+4*** 0.000 29.53E+4*** 0.001 
Debt 0.199 0.488 7.110*** 0.000 -4994.800 0.382 -3453.900 0.390 
Risk -18078.1 0.385 88.300 0.808 -58.89E+3 0.673 -6.310 0.998 
WorkingCapital 0.002*** 0.000 2.28E-04 0.972 387.400*** 0.000 301.800*** 0.001 
Industry No No Yes Yes 
R&DIntensity 22.000** 0.046 -1.630*** 0.000 -7884.800 0.551 5767.600 0.936 
Intercept     -13.8E+6*** 0.000 -12.94E+6*** 0.000 
Z 3379.430  125.490      
m1 -2.710  -1.460      
m2 1.260  -1.240      
Hansen 98.110  96.260      
We  run the following two models for common law and civil law country. This first is an Arellabo Bond GMM model and the second is a logit model: 
rPEGit = ø + ø1EMit + ø2DCSRit + ø3DCSR*EMit + ø4Sizeit + ø5Debtit + ø6Riskit + ø7Workingcapitalit + ø8Industryit + ø9R&DIntensityit + ηi + μit                                 
REPUTATIONit= ø + ø1EMit + ø2DCSRit + ø3DCSR*EMit + ø4Sizeit + ø5Debtit + ø6Riskit + ø7Workingcapitalit + ø8Industryit + ø9R&DIntensityit + ηi + μit                                                                                                        
See tables 4 and 5 for a short explanation of the variables.We report the coefficients (p-values) for each explanatory variables. 
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